One World

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

From the Editor

Ralph Dilworth

Welcome to the fall edition of *One World*. In keeping with the practice we started in the spring of this year, this edition focuses on the principal theme of the new Grade 11 curriculum: nationalism and identity.

Canadians have been historically ambivalent about this phenomenon. We yearn, in some way, to partake of a homogeneous, all-embracing identity that we can celebrate as do our neighbours to the south. We feel the lack of a common culture and mythology quite deeply, filling the void with whatever we can find to bind us together—hockey for some, medicare for others. On the other hand, we are often dismissive of the coarse jingoism and crude displays of patriotism that nationalism tends to generate. We open our journal with a meaty discussion of this dilemma in Canada. Dr Douglas Francis, of the University of Calgary, explores attempts by various groups to forge a sense of identity in this country—attempts, he postulates, that have been more divisive than unifying.

From the pen of Dr Sylvie Roy, of the University of Calgary, comes an exploration of the issues of nationalism and francophone identities. Dr Roy examine la problématique associée à la notion d'identité francophone, surtout en milieu minoritaire. Elle explore le sens et la portée qu'on pourrait donner aux efforts des francophones de maintenir leur culture et aux efforts des francophiles d'acquérir et de développer leur propre identité francophone.

Dr John Ferris, of the University of Calgary, targets the issue of national versus international interests and asks, To what extent should national or international interests be pursued? Dr Ferris offers a fascinating overview of two schools of thought regarding the pursuit of group interests: realism and liberal-internationalism.

Next is an excerpt from an author whom Peter Newman described as having "come the closest to defining the Canadian identity." Herschel Hardin has graciously allowed us to reprint pages 10–16 of his iconic 1974 discussion of Canadian nationalism and identity entitled *A Nation Unaware*. This book had a tremendous influence on my understanding of this country and, even now, it offers insight into the central questions or contradictions of Canadian life.

Our fifth article is by Gail Jardine, also of the University of Calgary. Dr Jardine shares her research using WebQuests to motivate students to undertake extended research. This technique encourages students to look at multiple perspectives and is very pertinent to research on nationalism issues.

Finally, Dr John W Friesen reviews *The Courts and the Colonies: The Litigation of Hutterite Church Disputes*, by Alvin J Esau. The issue explored here has clear links to our theme of identity, because it looks at the difficulties of merging two similar yet distinct groups—the Hutterites and the Bruderhof. This attempt to fuse two separate identities had unintended consequences, including the fragmentation of one subgroup of the Hutterite family.

Finally, I extend my heartfelt thanks to all the contributors to this issue of *One World*. We seek together a better Alberta and a closer, more informed community of social studies teachers. By contributing to this journal and by reading it, we participate in this common quest for knowledge, understanding and solidarity.

Nationalism in Canada

Douglas Francis

Douglas Francis is professor of history at the University of Calgary, where he specializes in Canadian intellectual history and Western Canadian history. He is the recipient of the Master Teacher Award at the University of Calgary. He is the author of Frank H Underhill: Intellectual Provocateur *(1986) and* Images of the West: Changing Perceptions of the Prairies, 1690–1960 *(1989), and co-author (with Richard Jones and Donald B Smith) of a two-volume history of Canada,* Origins: Canadian History to Confederation, *6th ed (2008) and* Destinies: Canadian History since Confederation, *6th ed (2008), and a one-volume history,* Journeys: A History of Canada *(2005). He has edited several volumes and has published many articles in his areas of specialty.*

Canadians have frequently looked enviously to the United States as a country that has a strong feeling of nationalism and patriotism and a clear national vision. In contrast, Canadians often lament the lack of a national feeling in Canada to give meaning and unity to the country. If indeed we lack a sense of nationalism and a common identity, it is *not* from a lack of attempts to create that nationalism and to impose some kind of unity upon the country. Canadian history is replete with numerous attempts to cultivate a common nationalism and national unity. In this article, I will do two things. First, I will outline various attempts to define and cultivate a Canadian nationalism, from Confederation in 1867 to the present. Second, I will show how nationalism has been a divisive rather than a unifying force in Canadian history. In a country as diverse as Canada, both physically and especially ethnically and culturally, any attempt to define a unifying Canadian nationalism ends up excluding groups and regions of the country rather than including them. Thus, I conclude that the lack of a homogeneous and unifying Canadian nationalism is one of the country's strengths, not a weakness.

In his superb Massey Lecture talks on CBC Radio in 1963, *Images of Confederation*, historian Frank H Underhill provides a definition of nation that is pertinent to expressions of nationalism in Canada. "A nation," he wrote, "is a body of men [and women] who have done great things together in the past and who hope to do great things together in the future. What makes them into a nation is not necessarily community of race, language, and religion, though these are powerful forces when they are present; it is their common history and traditions, their experience of living together, their having done great things together in the past, and their determination to continue doing great things together in the future." Underhill identifies two reasons why nations form. First, people with common cultural attributes—race, language and religion—choose to unite to maintain those traditions; this I would define as *cultural nationalism*. Second, people have a common historical tradition that unites them, and this tradition serves as an inspiration or vision for acting together in the future. The nation-state, in this case, provides the political framework in which its population can interact together amicably. This I will identify as *political nationalism*. These two forms of nationalism—cultural nationalism and political nationalism, the former looking to culture as the unifying factor, and the latter looking to political

ideals as the source of national identity—have coexisted throughout Canadian history from 1867 to the present, and have invariably clashed because they are based on diametrically opposed ways of defining a nation and expressing nationalism.

In 1867, the British North American colonies of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and the Province of the Canadas (brought about in 1840 by the union of Upper Canada and Lower Canada) agreed to unite; this was the beginning of Canada as a nation. Their reasons for uniting had little to do with a sense of national feeling and more to do with immediate concerns that these British colonies faced at the time, to which unity appeared to be a possible solution. These concerns included the threat of an American takeover at the end of the American Civil War; Britain's desire to lessen its responsibilities for its North American colonies; a decline in trade with both Britain, when it opted for free trade in the late 1840s, and the United States, with the termination of the *Reciprocity Treaty of 1854* in 1866; debt in all four of the provinces, due to over-ambitious railway building; and, in the case of the Province of the Canadas, political deadlock, as political coalitions formed and dissolved on a regular basis because of the failure to gain sufficient support in both parts of the province (Canada West [Ontario] and Canada East [Quebec]).

In both of Underhill's ways of constituting a nation, Canada in 1867 was lacking. It was not a country with a common "community of race, language, and religion." Nor was it a country made up of people who had a "common history and traditions … having done great things together in the past," determined to "continue doing great things together in the future." The colonies of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick were isolated from the colonies of Upper Canada (Ontario) and Lower Canada (Quebec). Upper Canada and Lower Canada had been brought together by the *Act of Union* of 1840 into the Province of the Canadas, but it had been a forced union (based on Lord Durham's recommendation), with a history of acrimony rather than harmony from 1840 to 1867. The Americans, in contrast, had fought a revolutionary war together to give them a common purpose and a mythology of unity when they formed into a nation in the 1780s. Thus, the new nation of Canada had to cultivate a sense of nationalism. In doing so, it faced at least two major challenges.

One challenge was to find a way to instill a feeling of patriotism in the new nation while still maintaining its loyalty to the mother country. For the Americans, this had not posed a problem when they came together. They chose to be independent from Britain, so the new American nation became the focus of the loyalty and patriotism of its citizens. The British North American colonies, however, consciously chose to remain tied to Britain through the Empire after 1867; nationhood did not mean independence. English Canadians and the majority of French Canadians considered the imperial connection to be the best means for the new nation of Canada to fulfill its national destiny. As a result, a "schizophrenic" relationship regarding nationalism developed from the very beginning, where *loyalty* meant loyalty to Britain, while *patriotism* was directed at Canada; the two blurred and conflicted. This duality of loyalty and patriotism was also a bone of contention between English Canadians and French Canadians, who differed as to the extent of loyalty Canadians owed to Britain.

The other major issue was French–English relations. If English Canadians had had their way in 1867, they would probably have wanted to assimilate the French Canadians into a pan–Anglo-Canadian nationalism. But the French Canadians were too strong and united for that to happen. As well, French Canadians were determined to ensure their survival in a larger union of predominantly English-speaking provinces. Despite these different agendas and despite a legacy of hostility between the two founding groups, there was also awareness that if the new nation were to survive and work, it had to be based on compromises. Historians have identified this willingness to put aside differences and to compromise during the negotiations as a "Spirit of Confederation." Out of this compromising and working together would come a *new nationality*, a term that the Fathers of Confederation used extensively in their deliberations.

What was the new nationality that the Fathers of Confederation believed they were creating in 1867? It was a political nationality, in which the basis of unity would *not* be a common culture, but rather a common commitment to the new political nation-state of Canada, based on the political ideal of acceptance of people with different cultural backgrounds living in harmony and respecting one another's differences.

The group that was most concerned about the nature of this new nation was the French Canadians. They already had their own strong feeling of nationalism, forged in part through their struggles with English Canadians since the Conquest, but also as a result of having a common language, religion and culture. They were determined to maintain their identity and ensure their survival while being part of a larger union of the British North American colonies. They did so

in two ways. First, they ensured that the new political structure set in place—a central government in Ottawa and new provincial governments in the four provinces—would be a *federal* system with a relatively equal division of power between the two levels of government. Equally important, the provincial governments (in the case of French Canadians, the Quebec government) were given jurisdiction over areas of cultural concern, such as education, that were essential for cultivating national sentiment. Second, the French Canadians fought for a form of nationalism in the new nation that would be based on political rather than cultural terms. Georges-Etienne Cartier, who was the chief spokesman for French-Canadian interests during the Confederation debates, best expressed the vision for the "new nationality" that was being forged in the union. "Now, when we were united together, if union were attained, we would form a political nationality with which neither the national origin, nor the religion of any individual, would interfere. … In our Federation we should have Catholic and Protestant, English, French, Irish and Scotch, and each by his efforts and success would increase the prosperity and glory of the new Confederacy. I view the diversity of different races in British North America in this way: we were of different races, not for the purpose of warring against each other but in order to compete and emulate for the general welfare." The new nation would be based on political unity and political nationalism and not on cultural unity or cultural nationalism, since the last two would simply not work. Thus Canada began as one political nation-state within which many cultures or nationalisms could coexist; the objective was unity in diversity, *not* diversity into unity.

At the same time that Confederation came about, groups emerged in both French-speaking and English-speaking Canada that objected to the kind of nation that was created in 1867. The French-Canadian nationalists believed that the new nation was not really a nation because it lacked a common language, religion and culture that all true nations needed to succeed. They argued that what Canada lacked, Quebec already had—namely, a nation made up of one race and having a common language (French) and religion (Roman Catholic); therefore, French Canadians could and should form their own separate nation-state. In the case of English Canadians, nationalist groups emerged, the most notable being the Canada First Movement, which complained about the lack of a strong nationalism and sense of identity in the new Canada. The group blamed the French Canadians in part for the lack of a strong identity, since their presence diluted what could otherwise be a cohesive national group with a common identity. Let's look at both of these new nationalist perspectives.

The French Canadians who sought to create a separate, French-speaking, Roman Catholic nation in Quebec in the mid-19th century were headed by a religious group known as the Ultramontanes. They believed in the subordination of the state to the church. In their view, the Pope constituted the supreme authority, not only on religious and spiritual matters but also over civil and political affairs. The term *Ultramontanes* means "over the mountains" and conveyed the belief that authority came over the mountains from the Vatican where the Pope resided. The Ultramontanes began a political movement in 1871 and issued a *Programme catholique*, in which they argued that the church had a right to advise Roman Catholics on how to vote. They were to vote for the *bleus*, the Conservatives, who were blessed with the colour of heaven (and happened to be supportive of the Church and of French-Canadian interests), and not the *rouge*, the Liberals, who were damned by the colour of the fires of hell (and were also anticlerical and too pro–English Canadian for the liking of the Roman Catholic church). The leader of the Ultramontanist nationalists was Ignace Bourget, the influential bishop of Montreal and a devout Jesuit, the strongest order in the province. Monseigneur Louis-Joseph Laflèche, the bishop of Trois-Rivières, was the intellectual who set out their vision of nationalism. In a speech entitled "The Providential Mission of the French Canadians," given in 1866, Laflèche proclaimed: "A nation is constituted by unity of speech, unity of faith, uniformity of morals, customs, and institutions. The French Canadians possess all these, and constitute a true nation. Each nation has received from Providence a mission to fulfill. The mission of the French Canadian people is to constitute a centre of Catholicism in the New World." In another part of his speech, he noted: "French Canadians truly make up a nation: the valley of the St. Lawrence is their fatherland." As you can see, the Ultramontanists believed that culture, not politics or geography, defined a nation, and that the French Canadians had all the cultural attributes for them to be a nation unto themselves and, therefore, they should have their own separate nation-state. This view of nationalism clearly clashed with that of Cartier's at the time. Here, as you can see, are the roots of the two opposing visions of French-Canadian nationalism today: the one leading logically to separatism, the other to a larger bilingual and bicultural nation in which French Canadians could coexist as equals with English Canadians.

In English Canada, a group known as the Canada First Movement (CFM) emerged in 1868. Made up of five young intellectuals, the group was concerned about the lack of myths, symbols, and national spirit within the new Dominion of Canada. As they commented at the time, "Never did an infant nation crawl into existence in such a humdrum, common-place, matter of fact way" as did Canada. They went on to note: "It was apparent that until there should grow not only a feeling of unity, but also a national pride and devotion to Canada as a Dominion, no real progress could be made towards building up a strong and powerful community … History had taught us that every nation that had become great, and had experienced an important influence upon the world, had invariably been noted for a strong patriotic spirit, and we believed in the sentiment of putting the country above all other considerations" (Denison 1909). The members of the group took upon themselves the role of creating a mythology for the Dominion of Canada. The individual within the group who went about defining a common Canadian nationalism was Robert Haliburton, the son of Thomas Chandler Haliburton, the author of the popular *Sam Slick* series. Haliburton set out the mythology in an inauguration speech for the new movement with the revealing title, "The Men of the North and Their Place in History."

The Canada First Movement believed that what made Canada great and could give the country a sense of nationalism was the fact that it was a northern nation. What all Canadians had in common was that they were "northerners." He identified Canada as a northern nation in three ways. First, it was made up of a rugged northern landscape on the northern half of the North American continent. Second, it had a northern climate. And third, the country was made up of immigrants who had all come from northern regions of Europe—or at least the only immigrants that counted: Britons, Scandinavians and Germans. Even the French, he pointed out, had come from the province of Normandy in northern France. These three qualities combined to create a northern race of people who were superior to all others, and especially superior to the Americans who lived in a less rugged terrain and had a gentler climate, both of which weakened them as a people. Canada's harsh landscape and equally harsh climate (where winter lasts for eight months of the year) had their virtues, according to the CFM: they created a hardy, virile people. Let me quote Haliburton, as he said it best:

> We [Canadians] are sprung from a dominant race, the first in peace and in war, and nothing less than a leading position will satisfy our people. Our corn fields, rich though they are, cannot compare with the fertile prairies of the West, and our long winters are a drain on the profits of business, but may not our snow and frost give us what is of more value than gold or silver, a healthy, hardy, virtuous, dominant race? … Can not the generous flame of national spirit be kindled and blazed in the icy bosom of the frozen north? … If climate has not had the effect of moulding races, how is it that southern nations have almost invariably been inferior to and subjugated by the men of the north? (Haliburton 1869, pp 4, 5)

He described Canadians as "The Northmen of the New World." (Ironically, Haliburton had respiratory problems in later life and had to go south every winter; so much for his own mythology.) The image of Canada as a northern nation even got into our national anthem, which was written roughly around the same time, in the phrase "the true north strong and free." A whole lecture could be written around that one idea.

There are two things to note about their mythology. First, it was based on a belief in environmental determinism, a popular view of the day. Environmental determinists believed that geography and climate shaped character. Northern people were superior to southern ones, as Haliburton noted, because they came out of a northern environment that made them hardy, virile and strong. Second, their mythology began a tradition that has carried on throughout Canadian history of looking to the land, particularly the North, as a defining feature of Canadian nationalism. In this respect, the North has played the same role in Canadian history and Canadian mythology that the West has done in American history: a mythical place that was more real than the "real region"—in the case of the North, the physical region north of the 60th parallel—because the region became associated with the nation as a whole, and because it had become a region of the mind, where all mythologies originate.

While the CFM attempted in theory to look at all groups as part of the northern race, including the French Canadians, in reality they viewed only one group as being the truly chosen northern race: the Anglo-Saxon race. Those of British descent were at the top of the racial hierarchy of the day; all others were inferior, including the French Canadians.

The true nature of the CFM was revealed in their actions in the North West when negotiations were under way, in the late 1860s, to purchase Rupert's Land from the Hudson's Bay Company to incorporate the region into Confederation. Members of the

Canada First Movement had gone out west to the Red River Colony to ensure that the region would become part of Canada and not be lost to the United States. In the quote above, Haliburton made note of the "fertile prairies of the West," which were fertile not only agriculturally but also as a breeding ground for the new northern race that was emerging in the new nation. What stood in the way of Canada's acquiring the region was the opposition of Louis Riel and his band of Métis, who resented the Canadian government's acquisition of the region from the Hudson's Bay Company without consultation with them. Riel and his band forbade the new governor of the region to enter the Red River Colony until their demands were met and took control of Fort Garry as the seat of their provisional government. Members of the CFM attacked Riel and the Métis, and the skirmish forced Prime Minister John A Macdonald to negotiate with the Métis. Out of those negotiations came the terms of the *Manitoba Act*, which made Manitoba the first new province to join Confederation, in 1870.

The point to note here in the context of the theme of nationalism is that another clash of nationalisms occurred soon after Confederation, besides the clash between French-Canadian and English-Canadian nationalists. The Métis saw themselves as a new nation, forged by descendants of mixed marriages between fur-traders and Aboriginals. As well, the Métis had consistently fought the Hudson's Bay Company's monopoly of the region—in the context of Underhill's definition of a nation, "they had done great things together in the past." They saw themselves as a distinct people, different from and superior to both their Native and European forebears. Their expression of nationalism was also exclusive, like that of the Canada First Movement, except that in this case it excluded anyone who was not of mixed Native and European heritage.

All three of these nationalist groups in the late 1860s—the Ultramontanes, the Canada First Movement, and the Métis—reflected an emerging trend in Canada at the time of Confederation: an expression of nationalism *along racial lines*. Again, Frank Underhill's observation in *The Image of Confederation* is insightful here. He pointed out that

> ... our nation was born just at the transition point when one era was coming to an end and a second era was beginning. The first era was the liberal-romantic era. The nationalist faith that derived from the upheavals of the American and French revolutions regarded the self-governing nation-state as the instrument through which a great spontaneous outburst of creative popular energies would be released. … But by the late 1860s, this messianic faith in the natural goodness of mankind when assembled in self-governing nation-states was being succeeded by a tougher, more realistic, more egoistic, more brutal type of nationalism. The second era is the anti-liberal, Bismarckian era. The emergence of Bismarckian Germany was the sign of a change in the atmosphere of the western world. Bismarck's system was constructed to preserve and strengthen the conservative, anti-democratic forces. … Nationalism [came to be seen as] a Darwinian struggle for existence among rival states, a struggle that may be carried on by economic and/or by military policies. In the powerful states, nationalism expanded into an aggressive imperialism.

I agree with Underhill's insight. In essence, the late nineteenth century, within the context of our theme of Canadian nationalism, saw a shift from nationalism expressed through political ideals of freedom of the individual, equality for all, and tolerance for cultural differences—what Underhill identified as "liberal-romantic" nationalism—to a nationalism defined along racial (cultural) lines. Where I disagree with Underhill is in where he put the demarcation line between these two opposing views of nationalism. He sees the Canada First Movement as the last attempt to create a liberal-democratic nationalism (his chapter on the formation and ideas of the CFM is entitled "The First Fine Careless Rapture"); I have suggested in my discussion of the Canada First Movement, especially in their actions in the Red River Colony, that they were the first group in English-speaking Canada to express nationalism in racial terms. I would argue that the Fathers of Confederation were the transition from a more liberal, tolerant nationalism to one based on the dominance of one race or group over all others. Their more tolerant perspective had not come about, however, because of any strong belief in liberal nationalism, but out of practical concerns of finding a way in which diverse groups in the new nation could live together amicably.

Let me briefly trace the evolution of this new form of cultural/racial nationalism from its emergence in the late 1860s to World War I and then look at the evolution of the counter-position of political nationalism in the same period. When the Canada First Movement disbanded in the mid-1870s, its members joined two other emerging organizations devoted to expressions of cultural nationalism. One was the Continentalists, who argued for closer ties with the United States, since the racial makeup, language and religious beliefs of the two countries were similar. The

member of the Canada First Movement who became the leading advocate of political union of Canada and the United States into one great North American nation was Goldwin Smith, a social critic of his day. In 1891, he wrote a book called *Canada and the Canadian Question*, one of the most controversial and popular books in Canadian history. He argued for a North American nation for three reasons: (1) it would be of economic benefit to most Canadians, (2) it would be a means to assimilate and eliminate the "damn French" who, in his view, were pulling Canada apart, and (3) it would be the first step to a larger union of the Anglo-Saxon race. According to Smith, the American Revolution divided a continent into two artificial nations and two groups of English-speaking people who should be together in one nation, because both shared basic cultural attributes: race, language and religion. So Smith argued for a cultural nationalism of the Anglo-Saxon race on the North American continent, which would make this new nation one of the most powerful in the world. He believed that such a political union would be to Canada's interest and he argued his case—very persuasively, I might add—along nationalist lines.

The other organization that emerged was the Imperial Federation League, founded in 1887. This organization promoted closer ties with Britain for the purpose of enhancing Canada's position in the world. So they, too, were Canadian nationalists, interested in advancing Canadian interests. They argued that if Canada were to become independent of Britain, it would be an insignificant nation on the northern half of the North American continent, of no interest to anyone, with no global influence and vulnerable to takeover by the Americans. As part of the British Empire—as an equal partner in the Empire, not as a junior partner—Canadians could play an important role in shaping imperial policy and playing a powerful role in the world. This would give Canadians a "sense of power"—the title of the book on the ideas of English-Canadian imperialists by the Canadian intellectual historian Carl Berger, in which he argues convincingly that English-Canadian imperialists were not colonialists, as earlier Canadian historians had labelled them, but Canadian nationalists. As he notes, "Imperialism was one form of Canadian nationalism." The arguments put forward by English-Canadian imperialists for some form of imperial federation were neither economic nor military, but spiritual and cultural. Like Goldwin Smith, they argued that English Canadians were part of the great Anglo-Saxon race, and so should form a nation based on this race that would include all Anglo-Saxons whether they resided in Canada, the United States, Australia, New Zealand or South Africa. It did not matter where they resided physically, since neither geography nor politics defined or shaped nations; what defined a nation was culture, and all Anglo-Saxons shared a common culture. Ergo, they formed a nation based on cultural nationalism. Let me quote George Parkin, one of the most ardent English-Canadian imperialists, and best known as the first secretary of the Rhodes Scholarship Trust, set up in honour of Cecil Rhodes to send the brightest youth in the British Empire to Oxford for a higher education. In 1892, George Parkin wrote a book entitled *Imperial Federation: The Problem of National Unity*. Note the juxtaposition of the two words *imperial* and *national* along with the word *unity* in his title. Clearly, for Parkin there was no contradiction. My quote from Parkin here will make sense only if one bears in mind that the "nation" he is talking about is neither Canada nor Britain, but a nation made up of the Anglo-Saxon race of which Canadians and the British were a part. What concerns him is the need for this Anglo-Saxon nation to take a larger role in helping the "less fortunate" and "inferior races" in the world, especially those who were part of the Empire, such as India, along with other colonies in Asia and in Africa, by providing these "lesser" beings with all the virtues of the Anglo-Saxon race. Here is Parkin's version of what Rudyard Kipling called "the white man's burden."

> Three hundred millions of mankind, who do not share British blood, of various races and in various climes, acknowledge British sway, and look to it for guidance and protection; their hopes of civilization and social evaluation depending upon the justice with which it is exercised, while anarchy awaits them should that rule be removed. … If we really have faith in our own social and Christian progress as a nation; if we believe that our race, on the whole, and in spite of many failures, can be trusted better than others, to use power with moderation, self-restraint, and a deep sense of moral responsibility, if we believe that the wide area of our possessions may be made a solid factor in the world's politics, which will always throw the weight of its influence on the side of a righteous peace, then it cannot be inconsistent with devotion to all the highest interests of humanity to wish and strive for a consolidation of British power. It is because I believe that in all the noblest and truest among British people there is this strong faith in our national integrity, and in the greatness of the moral work our race has yet to do, that I anticipate that the whole weight of Christian and philanthropic

> sentiment will ultimately be thrown on the side of national unity, as opening up the widest possible career of usefulness for us in the future; inasmuch as it will give us the security which is necessary for working out our national purpose.

One of the interesting observations arising from a reading of Canadian nationalists of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries about the future of Canada is that they did not consider Canadian independence an option. Instead, they looked to some kind of association with either Britain or the United States for Canada's national identity. Part of the reason was their belief that a nation could not survive without a cohesive nationalism based on common cultural values, which, they noted, Canada lacked.

At the same time that many English-Canadian nationalists in the late nineteenth century were defining their nation in cultural and racial terms, the same thing was happening among French-Canadian nationalists. The Ultramontanists were growing in strength and reacting to the growing racism among English Canadians by putting forward their own racist form of nationalism. One of the most vocal Ultramontanists was Jules-Paul Tardivel, an editor of a popular newspaper in Quebec known as *La Verité*. Tardivel was born in the United States of a French father and an English mother. His mother died when he was three; he was eventually sent to Ste-Hyacinthe in Quebec to be raised and schooled by the priests, so he was a convert to French-Canadian nationalism and to Roman Catholicism, and was one of its ardent defenders. Tardivel was putting forward his views at the same time as Henri Bourassa, the well-known Quebec politician and one of the finest debaters Canada ever produced. Both men were ardent French-Canadian nationalists, but their perspectives on nationalism were diametrically opposed. Their opposing views came out in an exchange between the two men in Tardivel's newspaper, initiated when Tardivel compared his brand of French-Canadian nationalism with that of the Nationalist League, a new organization begun in 1903 to promote French-Canadian nationalism that had chosen Henri Bourassa as its patron saint. I am going to quote extensively from their intellectual exchange because of their clear but opposing views. Tardivel wrote:

> We are labouring under no delusion: the nationalism of the League is not our brand of nationalism. … Our own brand of nationalism is French-Canadian nationalism. We have been working for the last twenty-three years toward the development of a French-Canadian national feeling: what we want to see flourish in French-Canadian patriotism; our people are the French-Canadian people; we will not say that our homeland is limited to the Province of Quebec, but it is French Canada; the nation we wish to see founded at the time appointed by Providence in the French-Canadian nation.

Henri Bourassa replied, on behalf of the Nationalist League,

> Our own brand of nationalism is Canadian nationalism, based on the duality of the races and the special traditions this duality imposes. We are working toward the development of Canadian patriotism, which in our eyes is the best guarantee of the existence of two races and of the mutual respect they owe each other. Our people, as for Mr Tardivel, are the French Canadians; but the Anglo-Canadians are not foreigners, and we view as allies all of them who respect us and desire, as we do, the full maintenance of Canadian autonomy. Our homeland is all of Canada, that is, a federation of distinct races and autonomous provinces. The nation we want to see develop is the Canadian nation, made up of French Canadians and English Canadians, that is, two elements separated by their language and religion as well as by the legal arrangements necessary for the preservation of their respective traditions, but united by brotherly affection and a common love for a common homeland.

Here again are the roots of the two French-Canadian perspectives on nationalism: one based on a belief in the need for a nation to have a common language, religion and culture *and* an independent state in which to fulfill its destiny; the other believing that a nation can exist within another nation as long as it is a federated and pluralistic nation. Tardivel was in the tradition of Lafleche; Bourassa that of Cartier. Tardivel and Lafleche not only shared an Ultramontanist background; they were also both intellectual purists, so to speak, concerned only with looking at nationalism in its pure and ideal state. Bourassa and Cartier were politicians who had to take practical issues into consideration and seek compromise. Cartier was better at compromising than Bourassa, and the same was true of Wilfrid Laurier, who, as prime minister from 1896 to 1911, had to constantly seek compromises between the extremes of English-Canadian and French-Canadian nationalists. Bourassa was more principled and less willing to compromise than was Laurier (he also needed to satisfy only the interest of his French-Canadian constituency rather than the country as a whole), and thus these two French-Canadian titans clashed constantly, although

each admired the other as a person. During one of the debates of the time, Laurier put forward his own vision of Canada that was in sentiment and in wording very similar to Cartier's, which was expressed some thirty years earlier. He was directing his comments as much to Bourassa as to English-Canadian cultural nationalists:

> We form here, or wish to form, a nation composed of the most heterogeneous elements, Protestants and Catholics, English and French, German, Irish, Scottish, each, let us not forget, with its own traditions and prejudices. In each one of these opposing elements, however, there is a common point of patriotism, and the only veritable politics is that which dominates this common patriotism, and brings these elements toward a unified goal and common aspirations. (Francis, Jones and Smith 2008, 95)

These clashes of nationalisms among French Canadians and between French Canadians and English Canadians played out in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries over a range of issues that can be understood only if seen as "nationalist" issues: the execution of Louis Riel, in 1885; the Manitoba Schools question; the Jesuit Estates' question, in the 1890s; the question of sending volunteers to fight in the South African War in 1899; the *Autonomy Bill*, when Saskatchewan and Alberta became provinces, in 1905; the debate in 1910 over whether to establish a Canadian navy; the Ontario Schools question in the pre–World War I period, which dragged on until the late 1920s before it was resolved; and, most bitter of all, the conscription crisis during World War I, which brought the divisions within the country to the breaking point.

Given these extreme expressions of cultural nationalism in the late nineteenth century, political leaders had to find alternative ways of cultivating nationalism and creating national unity so as to deflect attention away from divisive cultural issues. John A Macdonald found a way through an economic policy. In 1879, his government introduced a high tariff, ranging from 10 to 30 per cent, on all manufactured goods coming into Canada from the United States. The purpose of the tariff was to protect nascent industries in Canada so they could compete against American imports. Macdonald called this tariff the National Policy, thus associating it with the interest of Canada. He implied that it was a *national* policy because it was designed to keep Canada economically independent of the United States, and because it would unite the country, because the tariff, along with the building of a transcontinental railway (the CPR) and the development of the West, would foster east–west trade to offset the north–south axis of trade that existed prior to 1880. While focusing on an economic policy as an expression of Canadian nationalism took attention away from cultural and racial issues, it did not solve the problem of national unity. The West and the Maritimes complained that the National Policy of high tariff benefited central Canada at their expense, since the manufacturing would take place only in Ontario and Quebec, with the West and the Maritimes serving as hinterlands to this industrial heartland by providing the raw materials for the centre and, in return, buying their manufactured goods. The farmers and workers were also unhappy—they pointed out that the tariff benefited the industrial and business class at their expense, since manufactured goods produced in Canada were at least 10 to 30 per cent more expensive than these goods would be if brought in duty free from the United States. So, alas, even the attempt at a form of economic nationalism failed to unite the country. Just to bring the story up to date on the tariff issue, it was so successful that Wilfrid Laurier's Liberal government adopted its own version of the National Policy after assuming power in 1896. And the policy of high tariff was the core of Canada's economic policy right up until the 1988 Canada–United States Free Trade Agreement.

World War I was a turning point for Canadian nationalism. For the first time Canadians began to think seriously about a nationalism based on Canadian independence, or at least greater autonomy from Britain. There were two reasons for this shift. One was greater confidence on the part of Canadians because of the tremendous prosperity the country enjoyed from the turn of the century to World War I, so much so that Laurier predicted in 1904 that the twentieth century would be Canada's century just as the nineteenth century had been that of the United States. The second was Canada's tremendous and valued contribution to World War I, which included artillery, foodstuff and more than 600,000 men, of whom more than 60,000 died. This move towards autonomy played itself out in the political realm through a series of acts and treaties between 1918 and 1931 that distanced Canada from Britain and led to Canadian political, constitutional and diplomatic autonomy.

Culturally, the move to autonomy resulted in the rise of a number of nationalist groups committed to developing a pan-Canadian nationalism. One of the most interesting of these nationalist groups was the Group of Seven. Like the Canada First Movement half a century earlier, the Group of Seven also looked to the North as a symbol of nationalism. The Group

wanted to develop a unique Canadian tradition of painting that would set it apart from the European tradition. They found their common and unique theme in the northern wilderness. In a reflective 1948 article on the nationalist aspirations behind the Group's paintings entitled, "The Group of Seven in Canadian History," Lawren Harris, the most articulate of the members of the group, wrote:

> It is largely through the basic interplay between our vast land and the response it inspires in our hearts and minds that we shape our character and outlook as a people (p 28). … So it was that the creative life and work of the Group of Seven resulted from a love of the land. From the cities, towns, and countryside to the far reaches of the northern ice-fields it was an ever clearer and deeply moving experience of oneness with the spirit of the whole land. It was this spirit which dictated, guided, and instructed us how the land should be painted. To us there was also the strange brooding sense of another nature fostering a new race and new age (pp 36–37).

While the Group agreed that all Canadian landscapes could be inspirational, they believed that it was really the Canadian northern lands that were the true source of inspiration and Canadian nationalism. All of their well-known paintings are of northern landscapes, devoid of people and any hints of human habitation—just trees, rocks and muskeg. On this issue, Harris noted: "Canada was then, as it still remains, a long, thin strip of civilization on the southern fringe of a vast expanse of immensely varied, virgin land reaching into the remote north. Our whole country is cleansed by the pristine and replenishing air which sweeps out of that great [northern] hinterland" (p 30). One can note a number of similarities between the Group of Seven and the group making up the Canada First Movement, including a hint of racism in Harris's comment about "fostering a new race and new age."

However, the motives for the two groups looking to the North were different. The Group of Seven saw the North as a spiritual force that would cleanse Canadians who were corrupted by living in cities and becoming too caught up with materialism. As well, the North was the opposite of the South, and the South was the United States. So Canada's identity with the North would offer a counter-pull to the United States, which, they believed, posed a threat to Canada as a nation. Alas, their efforts at trying to create a common nationalism in the land, particularly in the North, also failed to unite the country. It was pointed out both at the time and since that most of their paintings, especially their most famous ones, were done in northern Ontario, in the Muskoka and Algoma districts. So the Group of Seven was criticized for presenting only one region of the country—Ontario. Artists in the West and the Maritimes claimed that the Group of Seven did not represent their regions so to call it "Canada's national artists" was a misnomer.

Another noteworthy result of World War I is the deep fissure that festered below the surface in French-Canadian and English-Canadian relations caused by the conscription crisis. It resulted in the emergence of a new nationalist movement in Quebec known as *l'Action française*—French action. The leader of the movement was Lionel Groulx, or Abbé Groulx as he was best known, who was the first to hold the Chair of Quebec History at the Université de Montréal, beginning in 1915. While Groulx never came out to advocate Quebec separatism, the whole thrust of his thinking and his views on history led to that logical conclusion. And he certainly became the "patron saint" of the Quebec nationalists in the interwar years. He was also greatly admired by the post–World War II Quebec nationalists because of his devotion to cultivating a strong Quebec nationalism, even though the post–World War II nationalists rejected his strong link between Quebec nationalism and Catholicism. But the two divisions within French-Canadian thought that prevailed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries continued in the interwar years and then intensified in the post–World War II era, especially in the Quiet Revolution of the 1960s, when Pierre Trudeau and René Lévesque clashed over Quebec's destiny.

While the perennial clash of French-Canadian and English-Canadian nationalisms continued unabated well into the twentieth century, new expressions of nationalism among ethnic Canadians and First Nations people surfaced. Like French-Canadian and English-Canadian nationalism, these new forms also had their roots in Canadian history but became more pronounced and aggressive by the 1960s. The nationalism of ethnic Canadians first emerged in significant form as a result of the appointment of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, better known as the B and B Commission, which was appointed by the Pearson government in the mid-1960s to address the Quiet Revolution in Quebec. Ethnic Canadians wondered why they were not represented and why Canada was seen only in terms of French and English. They demanded to be part of the Commission, so an additional section, *The Cultural Contribution of the Other Ethnic Groups*, was

added to the deliberations. When Trudeau came to power in 1968 he formulated a policy of multiculturalism that would formally recognize Canada as a multicultural country. The policy was adopted in 1971. Trudeau outlined his perspective on multiculturalism when he introduced the policy in the House of Commons:

> We believe that cultural pluralism is the very essence of Canadian identity. Every ethnic group has the right to preserve and develop its own culture and values within the Canadian context. … National unity, if it is to mean anything in the deeply personal sense, must be founded on confidence in one's own individual identity; out of this can grow respect for others and a willingness to share ideas, attitudes, and assumptions. A vigorous policy of multiculturalism will help create this initial confidence. It can form the base of a society which is based on fair play for all.

Here again is a political nationalism very much in keeping with that of Georges-Etienne Cartier, Henri Bourassa and Wilfrid Laurier.

Multiculturalism is not an expression of nationalism; nowhere is it mentioned that the objective of multiculturalism was to create a Canadian nationalism. It is, rather, recognition of the right of ethnic groups in Canada to maintain their own cultural traditions while being part of Canada. It is a modern version of Cartier's 1865 view of political nationalism through recognition of cultural diversity, although I think Cartier would have been horrified at the number of ethnic groups that would have to be accommodated. There are pros and cons to multiculturalism, which are too numerous for discussion in this article. The amorphous relationship between the cultural rights of ethnic Canadians and their need/desire to be part of Canadian culture makes multiculturalism challenging. Yet the strength of multiculturalism is precisely its recognition that there is nothing *Canadian* from a cultural perspective that anyone is required to conform to. Integration and identity come from association within a common political nation-state of Canada—a political nationalism based on a political ideal with the objective of *unity in diversity*—rather than a common cultural nationalism based on conformity and the objective of *diversity into unity*.

The catalyst for Aboriginal nationalism was the White Paper, put forward by the new Trudeau government in 1969, which recommended the elimination of reserves and the integration of First Nations people into Canadian society. First Nations saw this as yet another attempt to assimilate them. That suspicion was a natural reaction, given the history of First Nations people in Canada. Let me merely highlight some of the episodes that led to a more militant Aboriginal nationalism in the 1960s. In 1867, First Nations were considered to be wards of the state without constitutional rights, including the right to vote or to own property individually. Through the treaties, their land was taken from them, and they were put on reserves, many of which were made up of marginal lands and were geographically dispersed. The *Indian Act* of 1867 severely restricted the rights of First Nations and was clearly designed to assimilate Aboriginals into white society through the elimination of cultural practices, such as the potlatch, and through residential schools. During the two world wars, Aboriginal Canadians fought for Canada without receiving any reciprocal benefits or rights in return. Only after 1945 did First Nations people receive some of the basic rights of Canadian citizenship.

The aim of Aboriginal nationalism is to rally Aboriginal communities in a campaign for survival, equality, self-affirmation, recognition and self-governance. First Nations achieved an important step with recognition of their inherent rights in the *Constitution Act* of 1982, Section 35(1) of which states that the "existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed." But Aboriginal nationalists saw this as only the first step to a position of self-rule that, according to constitutional historian Michael Behiels (2007), was based on "an exclusionary nationalism that rejected any meaningful shared-rule for Aboriginals as Canadian citizens" (p 262). Aboriginals demanded negotiations based on recognition of their status as a nation—that is, nation-to-nation negotiations. The Canadian government naturally rejected this view in the same way it rejected negotiating with Quebec as a nation. Thus, again the issue becomes one of clashing nationalisms—Aboriginal nationalism versus Canadian nationalism.

As I stated at the outset, nationalism in Canada has been a divisive rather than a unifying force. And the best we can hope for is an expression of nationalism based on recognition by all Canadians, of whatever background, that the Canadian nation-state is the best political unit in which they can fulfill their aspirations as citizens. If there is any unifying nationalism, it must be a political nationalism in which no cultural or ethnic group is forced to conform to any norms other than respect for the rights of others—what I have defined as *political nationalism*. In a world of ethnic cleansing, mistrust of "the other" and intolerance

for the rights of people whose traditions are different from those of the dominant group, Canadians must continue to focus on political ideals—political nationalism—over cultural differences—cultural nationalism. If we succeed, Canada could continue to serve as a model for the rest of the world.

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Identités francophones et nationalisme

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Être francophone au Canada

Être francophone, pour certaines personnes, c'est être né francophone, c'est de parler et d'avoir été socialisé en français et vivre, ou du moins connaître, une culture francophone. Pour d'autres, c'est le sentiment profond d'appartenir à un groupe qui a lutté comme peuple fondateur pour obtenir ses privilèges et ses droits sur un territoire précis. Enfin, pour Heller et Labrie (2003), être francophone c'est d'utiliser son français pour bénéficier de certains avantages ou mieux profiter de la vie (obtenir un emploi bilingue ou découvrir d'autres cultures francophones au cours de ses voyages). En somme, être francophone s'avère être différent selon qui parle. Pour ma part, être francophone c'est avoir des compétences linguistiques en français et être accepté parmi un groupe en tant que membre légitime peu importe mes origines ou les autres langues que je parle. L'important c'est que je lutte pour la même cause, celle du peuple fondateur qui a des droits institutionnels et historiques et qui se doit de transmettre le flambeau du français aux générations futures (Mandin 2008). Nous pouvons avoir une identité francophone, franco-albertaine ou franco-roumaine par exemple. Mais qu'est-ce qu'une identité au juste?

Une identité ou des identités?

Une identité francophone c'est une identité en mouvance qui se traduit par des changements tout au long d'une vie. On deviendrait plus francophone à certaines périodes de notre vie, et moins francophone à d'autres. Plusieurs chercheurs travaillent sur le concept d'identités et sur la francophonie canadienne (voir un numéro spécial de l'ACELF, dirigé par Gérin-Lajoie en 2006 sur la question). Certains chercheurs examinent l'appartenance francophone des jeunes d'aujourd'hui par rapport à leurs activités parascolaires (Dallaire et Roma 2000). Pour ces auteures, l'identité francophone c'est :

> Une conscience de soi en tant que parlant français. Mais, l'identité francophone, c'est aussi la façon

> dont cette francité est vécue et pratiquée. En effet, l'identité est une performance, car c'est l'usage itératif de la langue française et la répétition des pratiques qui lui sont associées qui donnent un sens identitaire à la francité et qui produisent le « francophone ». Comme elle se construit à travers l'action, l'identité n'est pas un produit statique. Elle est en constante reproduction, car, en se renouvelant, elle est aussi réinventée et transformée. Bien que les caractéristiques telles que la langue maternelle et l'origine ethnoculturelle influencent la pratique de la francité, c'est par leurs actions que les parlants français viennent à se reconnaître et que les autres les reconnaissent comme francophones. (7e paragraphe au site suivant: www.acelf.ca/liens/crde/articles/18-dallaire.html, tiré du site le 17 septembre 2007).

Ces auteurs poursuivent en disant que les jeunes deviennent francophones en fréquentant les écoles francophones minoritaires et en participant à des activités dites francophones (cabanes à sucre, Festival du voyageur, ligues d'improvisation). Les écoles francophones minoritaires permettent aux parents ayant droit (sous l'article 23) de faire éduquer leurs enfants en français tout en vivant en milieu anglophone. En fait, plusieurs chercheurs ont mentionné que c'est par l'école que l'identité francophone peut se construire, l'école étant souvent le seul endroit où ces enfants peuvent apprendre et parler le français (Gérin-Lajoie 2003). Mais pouvons-nous être francophones sans participer à la vie scolaire ou communautaire francophone?

Certains chercheurs font la différence entre identité linguistique (l'utilisation de la langue) et identité culturelle et ethnique (Boisonneault 1996; Théberge 1998) mais peu s'entendent dans leurs recherches respectives sur les termes « français », « francophone » ou « canadien-français » pour définir l'identité linguistique ou culturelle. En bref, ces auteurs démontrent que les identités nommées sont fluides et peuvent signifier différentes choses pour différentes personnes, surtout pour les jeunes au Canada (Lafontant 2000; Marchand 1998). Les jeunes francophones ont des habitudes linguistiques ou culturelles différentes de celles de leurs parents. Certains ne vivent pas en français même s'ils comprennent l'importance d'utiliser leur français pour pouvoir continuer à le parler. Certains chercheurs ont démontré que les jeunes francophones, c'est-à-dire ceux qui fréquentent les écoles francophones minoritaires, se considèrent plutôt bilingues (Heller 1984; Cardinal, Lapointe et Thériault 1990; Gérin-Lajoie 2003).

Si les jeunes francophones qui fréquentent les écoles francophones en milieu anglophone situent leur identité entre bilingue (français-anglais ou anglais-français) et francophone, les jeunes anglophones ou allophones de l'immersion française, s'identifient également de façons variées. Selon eux et dépendamment de leurs expériences avec l'apprentissages des langues, ils ne sont pas anglophones unilingues et pas tout à fait bilingues ou multilingues. Ils se situent dans une troisième zone qui est souvent peu reconnue par les membres des groupes homogènes (anglophones ou francophones). Mais que veut dire être bilingue? Pour les élèves d'immersion française, être bilingue c'est pouvoir se débrouiller dans les deux langues. Pour les francophones en milieu minoritaire, « on conçoit le francophone comme a priori bilingue puisqu'il est impensable que quelqu'un vive en milieu anglophone et ne parle pas l'anglais » (Auger, Dalley et Roy 2007, 29).

Dans ce contexte les jeunes francophones, issus d'écoles francophones en milieu minoritaire ou de programmes d'immersion française, ont des identités un peu plus floues, même contradictoires. Ils se disent davantage bilingues ou multilingues, qui correspond justement à cette troisième zone, qui devrait être davantage apprécié et reconnue. Il faut comprendre que les francophones d'hier ne sont plus comme les francophones d'aujourd'hui et ne seront pas comme ceux de demain.

Un peu d'histoire

Le concept d'identité a été longtemps relié à la construction d'une nation, d'un territoire ou d'un pays. Si on prend l'exemple de la France, après la Révolution française un Français devait parler le français (et non le breton ou le catalan par exemple) afin d'être considéré un Français. Ce n'était pas n'importe quel français, les Français devaient parler le français normé. C'est la même chose pour les Américains: si on est américain, on parle l'anglais. Au Canada, la lutte pour l'accès aux ressources a toujours été entre anglophones et francophones. C'est seulement vers les années 60 que les québécois francophones ont pris leur place au niveau institutionnel. Le nationalisme canadien-français du début des années 60 serait donc dû, en partie, à deux phénomènes importants: la faiblesse grandissante de l'Église catholique qui n'a pas pu s'adapter aux changements de la révolution industrielle (Robert dans Plourde

2000; Hamelin et Provencher 1981); et la détermination des francophones à accéder au pouvoir sans se laisser assimiler aux anglophones. Le contrôle d'un État reste donc important pour les francophones. C'est en prenant des distances par rapport au Canada que le français au Québec a pu aspirer à une identité politique et à une situation de langue publique (Thériault dans Plourde 2000). Toutefois, les années qui suivront désenchanteront quelque peu les minorités francophones à l'extérieur du Québec puisque c'est au cours des années 60 que nous assistons à un certain écart entre l'État québécois et les dirigeants du réseau institutionnel canadien-français (Linteau 1994). Ces deux groupes n'ont pas la même vision du Canada français et du rôle de l'État. Les dirigeants du réseau institutionnel des minorités francophones à l'extérieur du Québec voient l'État comme un partenaire afin de suppléer aux défaillances du milieu par le financement de ses institutions, avec la vision d'une dualité culturelle non territoriale. Ils sont contre la modernisation des structures organisationnelles qui pourrait aboutir à la menace de leur existence (lors d'une crise financière, par exemple). Pour les dirigeants de l'État québécois, il est impérieux de se moderniser afin de permettre à la nation canadienne-française d'être au même niveau que les autres sociétés occidentales (Martel 1997). Pour ce faire, le Québec promeut un État qui lui est propre où ses membres auront la mainmise sur tous les aspects de leur vie sociale, politique et économique. L'État reste l'instrument de l'action collective.

À la fin des années 60 et au début des années 70, de nouvelles lois font valoir les droits des francophones. En effet, les élus canadiens-français sont assez nombreux pour que leurs voix réunies fassent pencher la balance en leur faveur lors des votes aux assemblées provinciales, et même fédérales. C'est ainsi qu'un vent favorable au bilinguisme souffle sur Ottawa dans les années 60. Le gouvernement fédéral réagit en nommant une Commission royale d'enquête sur le bilinguisme et le biculturalisme chargée de développer une vision de la présence des deux nations au sein d'une société multiculturelle. Le rapport de cette Commission aura pour effet le renforcement du bilinguisme au pays. Cet intérêt pour le bilinguisme aura un impact positif sur les minorités francophones au Canada puisque des emplois bilingues seront créés dans toutes les institutions fédérales auxquels certains francophones pourront accéder (Martel 1997). C'est également à ce moment-là que l'immersion française a débuté au Québec et s'est étendu partout au pays, afin de permettre aux enfants anglophones d'apprendre le français.

Les francophones du Québec ont non seulement accru leur mainmise sur les institutions politiques, sociales et économiques de la belle province, ils ont du même coup affermi leur identité linguistique et culturelle sur leur territoire. Toutefois, pour les nombreuses minorités francophones hors Québec, les combats ont été d'autant plus longs et difficiles que chaque communauté comptait moins de personnes parlant français ou se considérant francophones. Cependant, il existe aujourd'hui de nombreux établissements francophones d'un océan à l'autre où francophones et francophiles peuvent se rencontrer pour parler français, socialiser et avoir accès à des services en français. Des groupes communautaires, artistiques, culturels, religieux, scolaires et politiques sont maintenant établis dans toutes les provinces canadiennes. L'institution familiale, très souvent la source de son identité francophone, joue son rôle aussi. Les provinces canadiennes n'ont pas toutes des régions francophones bien délimitées, mais elles possèdent toutes des institutions publiques qui offrent la possibilité aux francophones de conserver leurs identités et de s'épanouir. Grâce à l'informatique et aux mouvements des populations, souvent d'un continent à l'autre, être francophone devient de plus en plus facile et complexe à la fois.

Quel avenir?

Autrefois, bâtir une nation signifiait rassembler sur un territoire un peuple qui possédait une langue, une culture, et souvent une religion. La construction d'une identité francophone canadienne a commencé ainsi. Puis, le Québec, craignant l'assimilation, s'est replié sur sa propre culture, source de sa fierté et de son identité propre, pour prendre d'assaut ses institutions provinciales et sa destinée. Pour leur part, les populations francophones hors Québec ont construit leur propre identité, leurs propres communautés et leurs propres bâtiments un peu partout au Canada. Être francophone au Canada aujourd'hui, c'est affirmer l'aspect francophone de son identité (quelle soit québécoise, franco-albertaine, bilingue, multilingue) en utilisant les services offerts et en créant et participant aux activités communautaires, sociales ou familiales en français. C'est par exemple inscrire ses enfants en école francophone ou en programme d'immersion française, que le français soit notre première, deuxième ou troisième langue, ou que l'on ait simplement à cœur d'apprendre ou d'améliorer son français. Qui fera partie de la francophonie canadienne, c'est à nous de le définir!

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Pursuit of National or International Interests?

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I am both a historian and a political scientist. Tonight I will be speaking in both tongues. I may talk less about history than political science, because I am trying to fit this speech into the available time. The questions I am addressing tonight are these: To what extent should national interests be pursued? And to what extent should international issues be pursued?

Let me begin by pointing out some semantic issues. I'm going to define *national* interests as *state* interests. If we were to focus on *nationalism*, we actually could interpret that question in a different way. If you are a firm nationalist, you may well believe that certain states are illegitimate. So a Québécois nationalist might believe that the best way to pursue a national interest in the Canadian context would be to destabilize the federal government and damage its interests. But I am going to focus on the issue of state interests, although I am willing to answer questions that talk about national interest.

As far as the term *internationalism* goes, I'll define it later. My definitions will not be quirky, but the matter is complex.

The bigger issue is how we understand the set of words, *should be pursued*. Many schools of thought about power politics would say that the term *should be* is irrelevant. *Should be* is a fantasy. What we must assess is *is*; how are interests pursued? And here, in fact, I am almost paraphrasing Machiavelli: he claimed to care not about what should be, but about things as they were. Consequently, the way you phrase the question determines the answer. When we look at the question of *should be* (Should nationalism be pursued? Should internationalism be pursued?), we are looking simultaneously at two different sets of issues—one being ethics, the other efficacy. From an ethical point of view, we, as individuals or collectively, may try to pursue what we think are good objectives. Indeed, it may well be possible for us to do

so. However, if you are addressing the issue of efficacy—in other words, how do groups interact when their interests conflict, or how does one group versus another achieve its ends?—we then find very quickly that there are limits to ethics. Please do not misunderstand me. I am not trying to suggest that you cannot do good things or that one should not try. I simply am saying that anyone who has had any involvement in any political movement, whether on the left or right, national or departmental, quickly comes to realize that self-interest or sectional interest plays a part in deliberations. At the same time, the mere fact of the existence of efficacy does not turn all human relations into gamesmanship or sociopathology. Very often when people talk about realism or the way people conflict over interests, they assume that you can pursue interests only by acting as if you were in a zero-sum game, where I can win only if you lose, or as if you were a sociopath. I do not believe that is true. In fact, speaking as a historian, I can say that no successful statesman of the previous century was simply a gamesman. They all had a powerful sense of values. They all believed they were pursuing objectives that were good. Even if we think those objectives were bad, it is wrong to think that they did not sincerely believe in what they were pursuing. Very few statesmen were more ideological and more driven by values than Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin. As a historian, I believe that people who are pursuing interests on behalf of groups are not just playing games, but also pursuing values, and trying to do so in an effective way. It is the interaction between these sets of values and the ways that games are played that I want to discuss.

There are different sets of ideas about how groups pursue interests when they conflict. The most powerful and raw of these sets of ideas is called *realism*, of which there are many different schools. In this talk, I will focus on the great classical realists like the ancient Greek historian Thucydides, the Italian political philosopher Nicolo Machiavelli and the English political philosopher Thomas Hobbes. All of these men argue, in essence, that there is a tragedy at the heart of human behaviour. It is a fallacy to assume that all humans can collectively find a goal that they will pursue together. Resources are limited. Life is short and precarious. People want what they want, badly and immediately. Your neighbour may be your enemy; certainly, you cannot assume that he will be your friend. If you pursue your own interests you will be driven, no matter your own intentions, toward conflict with the interests of other people and, therefore, become a rival, a threat or an enemy to them, as they will be to you; in order to win this competition both you and they will be forced into harsh actions. And, say the realists, those outcomes are unavoidable.

A modern school of realists that dominates the political science school of realism, often called neorealism, offers a more systematic explanation of the phenomenon. If you are in a multilateral situation with many competitors involving conflicts of interest and threat, you can never feel secure unless you know you can withstand a threat from all of them put together. And yet, the more secure you feel, the less secure you make every other member of that group. There is no such thing as pure defence in a multilateral situation—your power to defend yourself is also your power to threaten other people. Your security equals their threat. The mere existence of a multilateral situation creates a sense of threat.

Whether you are a neorealist or a classical realist, you really are saying that conflict is inherent among human beings, that they will pursue their interests through very hard means and that, if they are serious and dealing with serious issues, they will pursue them with the most powerful means they have. If they believe their vital interests or survival are at stake, they will take terrible steps to preserve themselves. The classical statement of realist thought was written by Thucydides, somewhere around 410 BCE, in the so-called Melian Dialogue.[1] This work describes a moment, in 417 BCE, when Athens, during the long Peloponnesian War, decided to bring under its control a neutral island in the Aegean, Melos. The people of this island genuinely had tried to avoid involvement in the war. From the Athenian perspective, however, any independent state in the Aegean Sea was a political threat to its rule over other islands, because it was a bad example to its subordinates. In the Melian Dialogue, the Athenians send a fleet to the island of Melos, where Athenian delegates speak to Melian delegates. The Melians ask the Athenians why they have come to threaten people who have done them no harm. The Athenians respond that the Melians are setting a bad example. The Melians counter that what the Athenians are doing is wrong. The Athenians respond that the strong do what they will and the weak do what they must. The Melians are a problem for the Athenians to solve—they could become a dependant ally, in which case, the Athenians would leave them alone, or they could resist and be destroyed. The Melians answer that the gods would protect the innocent; the Athenians reply that this is not their experience. The Melians say that what the Athenians are doing is wrong; what they are doing is right and

they will defend themselves. A few years later, Thucydides' account of the Peloponnesian War mentions that the town of Melos fell, and the Athenians killed every adult male, sold every woman and child into slavery, and turned the island into a colony. The Melian Dialogue is the start of western systematic thinking about international relations and power politics. It is a brutal statement of what realism argues: that power exists, interests exist, people have conflicting interests, they will use power to preserve their interests and they may well choose to do so in terrible ways, because conventional individual morality does not define the behaviour of people collectively, or of states pursuing their own interests.

That may not be a point of view that we like, but neither is it the only one about power politics. For thousands of years, there have been nonrealist views on the matter. All major religious groups have attempted to control the way that states use force. St Thomas Aquinas offered several criteria to determine whether or not a specific war could be regarded as just, which are still useful today, although 99 per cent of his argument comes from interpreting Christian scripture in a tortured way. There has also been a rise in the past two centuries of a nonrealist body of thought that we would call *liberal internationalism*. Intellectually, you can trace its roots to the German philosopher Immanuel Kant and his work "Perpetual Peace." You also can trace it to the behaviour of evangelical groups who, from the late eighteenth century, argued that it was essential to reform corrupt elements of society, including power politics. The anti–slave-trade movement, one of the great successes in international humanitarian interventionism, was an antirealist movement that argued that individuals actually can use states as instruments of good in the world and therefore can eliminate bad things. There is very long history to liberal internationalism. People who first try to come to terms with it often assume that it is a modern phenomenon—a mid- or late-twentieth-century phenomenon. In fact, its roots go back to the late eighteenth century. The nineteenth century is filled with efforts by states (and also non-state actors) to limit the effect of war or the effect of armed forces on civilians, or to try to substitute international arbitration for war as a means to pursue complex interests. The history of liberal internationalism illuminates its strengths and weaknesses, its successes and failures. It is not a new idea.

There are several different ways of looking at how states can act in the world. A realist point of view argues that states cannot be moral agents, which is not to say that they do not reflect the moral and political values of their citizens. Thucydides and Machiavelli would insist that every state must do so. However, they would also say that if you try to use a state to pursue the good, you will be vulnerable to any competitor who pursues only self-interest. To pursue ethics is to weaken your efficacy in a dangerous world. Against that, nonrealist bodies of thought argue that we should try to prevent states from behaving in certain ways. We should at least try to limit the degree to which states use force against one another or against civilians. Even more, many people argue that states can and should be moral agents. In the past few centuries, those people have had a fair degree of influence and have changed, to some degree, the behaviour of states.

If you look at the behaviour of states in the past few centuries, they do not always or even mostly behave in the psychopathological way that a hard-core realist would predict. States often do not do the nastiest things they could do. At the same time, states often do not simply use force to achieve their ends, even when they have reason to think it would work. Our very existence is a classic example of that phenomenon. Canada came into being, in part, because the British had enough power to limit what Americans could do. That, in turn, bought Canadians enough time in the mid-nineteenth century to create a state that proved, in the long run, to be able to hold together. Our very existence is a minor sort of miracle. At some point in the early twentieth century, however, the British lost their ability to check the Americans. Had the Americans behaved purely as a realist would, nothing could have stopped them from eating us up. They did not do so, however. Indeed, Western liberal democratic states from the mid-nineteenth century onward were surprisingly reluctant to use force against one another as a means to solve interests. Instead, they chose to compete in other ways, often ferocious—economic competition is far more pitiless than military competition. Americans certainly have tried to bully Canada in economic terms, and they have sometimes succeeded. Yet the liberal states have generally not used force or even the threat of force against one another. On the other hand, they have often gone to war against peoples outside the liberal sphere, while nonliberal peoples routinely have used force against all comers.

What I am arguing, then, is that in practice it would be wrong to say that the whole of international behaviour in the past two centuries has been defined by realism. Much of the time, the pursuit of narrow state interests by the most efficacious means possible is not what has guided the way states behave. On the

other hand, when it comes to the most vital issues, states have not shrunk from using force against one another. States have defined their interests in hard-headed fashion, and tough means of international competition among them certainly has been normal. My point is that all these bodies of thought give very clear, pure predictions of how states will behave, but that none of them predicts accurately everything that happens. If you forget either one of them, you will not understand how the world works, but one of them is more important to remember. If you do not understand realism, you cannot understand how states will behave when they compete over limited resources. You may not like it. You may wish to change that form of behaviour, but to imagine that there are no such things as power and interest is to misunderstand how the world works. In fact, it is like imagining that gravity does not exist. Power and the pursuit of one's own interest are fundamental to the way human societies function.

If we turn from these general issues to the question of how modern political scientists define different means of looking at international relations, we find that they fall into three different camps. As a historian, I will argue later on that I fall into every camp simultaneously. Political scientists, however, try to be more rigorous and will allow themselves to dance only with the partner that brung 'em. One camp is that of neorealism. Its main point is that the struggle for interest does not arise from some primitive desire within your heart for power. That struggle, instead, arises from the fact that you are in a multilateral relationship and competing over scarce resources. It is because you have rivals—that is, threats and potential enemies—that you are driven to use and pursue power, and in doing so you cause others to behave in a reciprocal fashion to you.

The second group, liberals, fall into many different groups. They are chastened, intellectually—liberals writing in the 1920s and 1930s had far more faith that liberalism offered a solution to the evils of power politics than their descendants have today. The way the Second World War broke out did, in fact, permanently affect the way liberals thought about international relations, because they learned that even if you tried to behave in a nice, fair and unprovocative fashion, it did not necessarily stop your neighbours from being extremely unpleasant and, indeed, might actually make it easier for them to be so. The liberal view is really a continuation of the arguments that Immanuel Kant put forward two centuries ago, which centred on the idea that we can create a better world and that both individuals and states can change their behaviour. In particular, liberal states might actually behave differently towards other liberal states than towards nonliberal states. That, incidentally, is exactly what Kant predicted in his 1795 article, "Perpetual Peace," which advocated the rise of republics that would sign nonaggression pacts and never go to war with each other, but would do so for collective defence against militaristic monarchies.

Finally, we have people who are loosely called constructivists. There really is not a fundamental difference in views towards international relations between liberals and constructivists. Constructivists, however, tend to have specific political agendas and argue that you can make the international system move in very specific ways in order to construct a different world. Even more, constructivists argue that we all construct our own reality. There is no predetermined way that human beings will function. Therefore, nothing stops us from creating a paradise of a very specific form tomorrow.

Political scientists spill much blood and ink over these issues. I outlined them here so that you can see the different ways in which the largest group of academics who think about international relations treat those issues. As a historian, I am simultaneously a realist and a liberal and have no general problems with constructivism at all. To paraphrase Karl Marx, we do, after all, construct our world, although within real limits (the failure to remember that condition is the main weakness of constructivism). States do change their behaviour, and sometimes have decided on moral grounds to do certain things and not do others, and have tried and, within limits, succeeded in acting as agents of good. Of course, wanting to be an agent of good is different from succeeding in that effort. Let me demonstrate that point by returning to the anti–slave-trade movement. Powerful, morally based lobbies in Britain, to a lesser degree in France and also, finally, in the United States convinced their governments that the slave trade was an evil that should be abolished. This is one of the first cases in history of states acting on the principle of the right to protect—one of the first cases of liberal international intervention. Nonetheless, the abolition of the slave trade had some unfortunate consequences. For example, the British came to realize that the slave trade could not be stopped unless several things occurred, one of which was stopping African middlemen from bringing slaves to the coast. In order to do this, the British had to establish military control or indirect rule over African territories. It is in those places that, decades later, European imperialism in Africa was born.

The problem for states that use their power to pursue good is this: states may act as moral agents, but power, by nature, is amoral. It is a tool that can be used to pursue good or bad, and it is not a simple tool. If you use it against competition, you enter an amoral relationship. Simply because states use national power for international interests does not mean that one can avoid steps which, in the long term, are tragic or counterproductive or perverse or unintended. Those are consequences that citizens of Western countries should remember whenever they talk about interventions in any countries of Africa, Asia or the Middle East. It is easy to say that there is a terrible problem, that we have power and God on our side (because we are good), and therefore we can solve that problem by using our power. That sounds nice until you are there, because then you will discover that whenever you use power, realist rules apply. If you are up against local rivals who do not like you, they will respond in ways that do not assume you are good. It is dangerously—tragically—easy, even for a powerful, liberal, well-meaning state pursuing good interests, to end up doing things that are bad, from the perspective both of ethics and efficacy.

My final point tonight addresses the issue of nationalism and internationalism, and the way that Canadians have defined national interests and been involved in international affairs throughout the past century and a half. I am not speaking here as a historian of Canada, but of Britain. Most countries, including Australia, a country not dramatically dissimilar from ours, develop a tradition of using national assets to pursue national interests. They face specific problems for which no one else will create a solution. If they are going to solve these problems, they have to generate tools—forms of force. Through a relationship that is normal in the world, they define national means to achieve and define aims and then pursue them. Historically, Canada has found itself in a different position, for complicated reasons. First of all, we were sheltered by a peculiar relationship between Britain and the United States, in which the British, until the First World War, could keep the Americans in check. If the United States had tried to invade Canada, the Royal Navy would have blown up every American coastal city. If you examine where the United States spent its defence money until 1900, you will see that it was on defending their major coastal cities against the Royal Navy. To man those coastal defences, the Americans had to deploy their entire regular army. The Royal Navy actually tied down the entire American regular army and prevented it from threatening to invade Canada. Canadians, however, did not really understand how this happened—how someone else's power sheltered us against a potentially hostile country. In later years, the United States chose to tolerate and cooperate with an independent Canada to the north. This placed us in a position whereby our nearest neighbour was far stronger than we were, and we could not possibly hope to win if it attacked us. On the other hand, it would not attack us, and even more, it would prevent anyone else from doing so. Our only possible threat was our protector. These relationships made it hard for us to use national power to pursue specifically national interests. Simultaneously, we also found ourselves involved in world affairs because of our links to Great Britain. What emerged is an odd Canadian tradition that virtually no other country in the world shares.

Canadians played a remarkable part in two world wars and in maintaining the Western coalition during the Cold War (though admittedly, one that became less significant after 1967, as, indeed, did Canada in the world). At the same time, we did not take these steps in order to pursue narrow national interests. The Australians, during the same period, had very specific interests. They wanted to ensure that Indonesia was not a problem and that southeast Asia remained stable and pro-Western, and they threw their resources behind regimes or Western powers that could help them achieve their ends. From our perspective, we did not really need to help Britain in either world war. We got involved in the Second World War because the British were attacked, and we felt a sense of loyalty to them and believed they were likely to be on the side of the right. This was quite true. Nevertheless, we did not take these actions out of any narrow set of national interests. Instead, Canada chose to lend its national power to liberal, Anglo world powers to help them achieve international objectives that we liked, such as sustaining a liberal status quo across the world. We invested many Canadian resources in active international policy during the twentieth century—in two world wars and in work with NATO, the UN and other multilateral organizations. But we did not do so to pursue Canadian interests. Instead, we did it to try to maintain a world order in which Canadians could feel that their values and economic interests were secure. Our way of war was to lend Canadian forces to serve under the command of other countries in order to pursue specific objectives defined in other capitals through a process over which Canadians had limited power. This is exactly what we are doing in Afghanistan. I am not defending it, by the way. I am simply saying that what is happening in Afghanistan today is entirely within the norm of Canadian foreign policy.

What is, however, beginning to emerge as an issue that challenges this Canadian way of thinking about power and politics is the Arctic. Assuming that global warming continues, the Northwest Passage will become open and, suddenly, for the first time, all of those characteristics I defined earlier will no longer apply. The Canadian legal claim to Arctic territory is flimsy, although so is that of everyone else. No one actually has a clear-cut legal claim. The United States does not recognize our legal claim to the Arctic and, in fact, neither does any developed country in the world. Our legal claim is fairly unusual and it is certainly not one that the Americans or the European Union would easily accept. All and sundry with interests in the area are now starting to throw their weight around, even the deadly Danes. If the Arctic becomes a significant issue of national and international conflict, for the first time in our history we are going to have to think about defining and creating national tools of power to pursue specifically national objectives against the interests and will of countries that are stronger than we are. That is, we will have to behave like a normal country. In other words, the issues addressed in Grade 11 social studies tie together the history of the world and of Canada in the past few centuries, and link them to events that are going to become important in the next decade.

Note

1 Thucydides, *The Peleponnesian War*, trans R Crawley (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1982), Book 5, Chapter 17.

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

Canada as a Series of Contradictions

Herschel Hardin

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To get at the Canadian circumstance, and through it, to identity, and to escape from riddles with no answers, is above all to see the country in terms of its *contradictions*—the contending forces that underlie the character of the people. The same methodology of contradictions can also provide luminous insight into certain societies with strong common symbolism, like China and the United States, or into historical characteristics shared by a group of countries (western Europe, and so on) that lend themselves to such an approach.

The central contradiction of Chinese civilization, for example, is the one between the educated elite and the masses of the people—a contradiction rooted in the ancient circumstances of the Chinese people.

From the earliest days of settlement of the Yellow River Valley, the Han people realized that only a strong, central authority could maintain and synchronize the necessary diking and canal systems over long stretches of the river. This centralized control, in turn, was impossible without an administrative class. Chinese civilization, the unique Chinese mentality, the codes of behaviour (Confucianism, Maoism) which are characteristic of the Chinese, are the products of the contradiction between this class (mandarins, Communist Party cadres), without whose consent no dynasty could govern, and the peasantry—the mass of society—without whose consent no dynasty could survive.

One could almost say that only in terms of that fundamental age-old contradiction does Maoism, in its antibureaucratic thrust, the Cultural Revolution, the particular route by which China has become a modernized mass democracy ... only in those terms does any of it become intelligible, do the Chinese become visible as Chinese rather than as inscrutable Europeans with yellow skins.

In the same way, not the only, or the most useful, but the richest appreciation of American character comes not from celebrating or deploring Americans' legendary materialism and violence, or from observing them worshipping their myths and demonstrating

their patriotism, but from exploring the contradictory phenomenon of an America irrationally, intolerantly absorbed in the myth of rational, liberal freedom.

This is the contradiction which Louis Hartz illuminated with such gusto in *The Liberal Tradition in America* [1991, Harvest]. "Here is a doctrine [liberalism]," wrote Hartz, "which everywhere in the West has been a glorious symbol of individual liberty, yet in America its compulsive power has been so great that it has posed a threat to liberty itself." The mark of Hartz's originality was that he gave this "compulsive power" such bold and suggestive names that they encapsulate in a few words the particular psychic, parochial dilemma which is America—names like "colossal liberal absolutism," "the national irrational liberalism," "the grip of Locke" and the "Americanistic mechanism" of terrifying dissenters. But part and parcel of the American contradiction, with its Red scares and its absolutist intolerance in the name of freedom, is a quality of individual freedom and creative energy unknown to the rest of history, but again, an individualism and a creativity of a special kind—the American kind.

Contradictions also inform the industrial European experience—the contradictions of class. Merely to mention them is to write a footnote to Marx, to all of the European Marxists, to all the European anti-Marxists, and to all the non-Marxist, non-anti-Marxist appreciations of European class differences. Whatever the strength of class contradictions in Europe now, modern European society has evolved by the elaboration of those contradictions, and I doubt if there is any European who does not have fragments of that elaboration embedded in his psyche.

What are the basic contradictions of the Canadian experience? There are three of them: (1) French Canada as against English Canada, (2) the regions as against the federal centre and (3) Canada as against the United States. The second one incorporates much of the first, Quebec being both the thrust of French Canada and the most centrifugal, psychically, of the regions. It is across these contradictions that Canada has defined itself.

That these three contradictions are at the centre of the Canadian experience, that they have been the forcing ground of our identity, is obvious. But Canadians have exquisite ways of missing the point.

One poignant case sticks in my mind, because it illustrates the leading Canadian contradiction at work on a man whose identity as a Canadian was still in the process of formation. It was during the St Leonard controversy [in 1968] over whether all schools should be French language, or whether there should be English-language instruction available as well [St Leonard was a suburb of Montreal that was heavily populated with Italian immigrants]. An ethnic spokesman caught in the crossfire protested with quiet emotion to CBC Radio that his group was an innocent victim of an inexplicable quarrel, all the more innocent because they had no ingrained hostility against French Canadians. We're not against the French Canadian, he said. And we're not against the English Canadians. We just want to be Canadian.

It never occurred to him that having to explore this linguistic conflict, having to get behind it in order to understand it and cope with it, and in intensely passionate, practical circumstances, would give him more insight into what it meant to be a Canadian than most Canadians would gather from a lifetime. Even while he was protesting, he probably had already realized there was no total escape from the contradiction other than by leaving the country. Wasn't that why he was protesting in the first place? And after going through that experience, would he ever agree that being a Canadian and an American involved more or less the same thing?

Here is where the Canadian character is working itself out in passion, and even in blood. By contrast, the dispatch of available search parties on exotic missions into the tundra and muskeg and the land of stunted conifers, where few Canadians actually live or have visited, in search of identity is escapist fantasy.

Canadian identity is in the guts of the physical and psychological settlement, not on the periphery of the hinterland.

On top of that familiar Canadian syndrome of identification with the subhuman—the northern subhuman now—and tied into it, we now perceive, also, the self-demeaning habit by which a once confident people has been conditioned to look at itself through the narrowing eyes of the other peoples infected with other contradictions—which habit is the colonial mentality.

In other words, if you ask an American, or a European, or a Chinese question, you won't get a Canadian answer.

"There is no great national hero who cut down a maple tree, threw a silver dollar across the St Lawrence and then proceeded to lead a revolution and govern the victorious nation wisely and judiciously," we are told. Nor are there any "great Canadian charters of freedom or independence expressing the collective will of the people," which we can put behind glass in our post offices or tack onto the walls of our offices and workshops, we are told. Then, when we are told that "Canadians have both thought and acted like contemporary nationalists" by throwing up tariffs and building the CPR, we still wonder why John A Macdonald couldn't

have thrown a silver dollar instead of giving away 25 million paper ones. The assiduously researched fact that Macdonald was an alcoholic is good stuff, but as we know in our bones, it's a poor substitute for George Washington's encounter with a cherry tree. It would never survive, if it weren't for the tariff on history.

But any Canadian substitutes for the War of Independence and the other objects in the American museum will be poor myth because they will be weak in Canadian contradictions. They will be the symbolic outcroppings and residue of nothing at all. The languishing after a common symbolism, in the way that the national mythology of Britain or China or France or the USA is common to the citizenry, is a sorrowful wild goose chase—a Canada Goose chase. It is the uncommonly Canadian, uncommon symbolism we should be trying to uncover, and it is here, because we are.

The colonial wives' tale that, being a country of immigrants, Canada is "a land with little common civilization," also misses the point—misses several points—and in the same way. It begs the question: What kind of immigrants and in what historical context? It ignores the powerful effect which indigenous influences and circumstances can have on immigrants, if the new country is politically and economically free. A spirit of independence abroad in the land is crucial if the indigenous circumstances are to have an impact.

The United States is also a country of immigrants. Yet was there any doubt, even from the earlier days of settlement before the War of Independence, that life in America was different in kind from life in Europe, that it functioned by a different ethic and in a different spirit, quite apart from the novel economic demands of the frontier? An immigrant, from out of the class contradictions of Europe, came to America, a land of immigrants—and nothing else except the beleaguered Indians—and he was a new man almost overnight. And this new dimension which America brought out in him, and which he shared in common with other immigrants, had little to do with this own past loyalties or with shared historical experience in Europe. The American way of life was in the air of the new society, and having to breathe, he breathed it in, and breathed it in freely, without a European sack over his head—and that was important to the exercise.

Nevertheless, there were scholars and commentators from "civilized" Europe who continued to see the United States as a country of immigrants with little common civilization other than economic techniques and the legal and parliamentary traditions and other cultural hand-me-downs inherited from Great Britain. James M Minifie reminds us that in the early days of the Republic, Englishmen, when they wanted to be friendly, often expressed the view that between the two peoples there wasn't much difference—that Americans were just "transatlantic John Bulls"—and that they were amazed at the apoplectic reception they received. Tocqueville knew better. (In the same way, a correspondent of the *Washington Post* wrote recently that we are "undeniably similar," although "nothing annoys some Canadians more than to be told [as much] by well-meaning Americans.")

The "Canadian way of life," as seen in terms of its own contradictions rather than other peoples', is similarly different in kind from American civilization, and is roughly just as old, dating back at least to the Conquest, when French Canadians began to realize that their only chance of survival was inside a state dominated by English-speaking power and later English-speaking numbers, and when English-speaking Canadians began to realize that the French Canadians existed in a body and might even endure. Then, and ever since, that contradiction has infected everything.

Now, if you consider common civilizations in their European sense only, and look to them for national identities, you are forced to conclude that immigrants become Canadians by joining one of the two sides. But that way, in fact, they just become English Canadians or French Canadians. It is only when they are caught up in the elaboration of the primal Canadian contradiction between the two groups that the inescapable, dense, bewildering sense of what it means to be a Canadian rather than a transplanted European, or American, hits home, as many an immigrant parent in Montreal can testify. Newcomers become transformed into natives almost overnight, and without common histories, in Canada too.

Two hundred years and more of the elaboration of a constant set of defining contradictions is not a long time as some civilizations go. But it is not a short time either. It parallels, for example, the entire duration of the industrial age, with its antecedents in the mercantile glories of England and France.

Canada is not a young country. Canada is not "a land without real history . . . rootless, cut off, out of touch, and therefore barren." Canada is not "collectively youthful." Canada is not "culturally immature." Canada is a country of immigrants only incidentally. The notion that "the Canadian reaction to life is a strictly contemporary one," that we can "escape history," not having had a continuous history which has formed our characters, holds true only outside the Canadian contradictions, which means that it doesn't hold true at all. There is a thick continuity in us, as a collectivity, which has been deeply felt when Canadians have been in an independent mood.



WebQuests and Knowledge of Others: Motivating Students to Undertake Extended Research

Gail Jardine

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Walking home from public school in the 1950s, I remember being fascinated by a small house. It was set further back from the road than others on the street, and its dark yard was full of large trees, shrubs and vines. There were no flowers. I did not usually go home this way and when I asked my friends about the house, I was told in hushed tones to never go close because the old lady who lived in there changed any child who trespassed into a silver spoon. In Grade 1, I believed it. However, I've since learned that adults, too, can suffer from childish fantasies and fears. They can be misled by misinformation, prejudices and skewed perspectives at times. It is all too easy to make hasty judgments and decide that *other people*—people with other priorities, values and unfamiliar practices—are simply wrong, if not crazy or even evil.

Teachers see this on school playgrounds and in class discussions. Also, at times, adults utter prejudiced opinions and urban myths about people from other cultures (descriptions that will not get any ink here). Even scholarly accounts of world events and issues can be one-sided and permeated with self-serving opinions rather than careful research into the facts of the matter. Consider the following examples:

- The effects of colonialism on the colonized and the colonizers (Hardt and Negri 2000) and conflicts over First Nations land claims in Canada (Edwards 2003; Miller 2004)
- The effects of economic globalization and the policies of the World Trade Organization on nations' sovereignty and well-being (Barlow and Clark 2002; Stiglitz 2003)
- The understandings and misunderstandings that permeate the United States–Iraq war and the war on terror generally (Barber 2001; Benjamin and Simon 2003; Aslan 2006)
- And the refusal, until recently, on the part of some to consider that global warming is caused by hu-

mans' carbon dioxide emissions, and that the tactics used to argue this followed those of the tobacco industry in their attempts to reject the connection between smoking and lung cancer (Flannery 2005; Monbiot 2007).

Much of my work as an educator is driven by the critical need I see for all people on Earth to understand far more about one another than we currently do. We need to become much more informed about one another's life circumstances, values, hopes and dreams. We also need to learn much more about communicating with one another with respect, understanding and empathy. We need to become aware and to teach our children how to assess the validity of the information we get about people living in other cultures and/or in other countries. We need to be proactive rather than reactive about these needs.

There are levels of selectivity that restrict the ability of our mass media to give us the whole picture. Michael Enright, on a CBC Radio *Sunday Morning* program, on Foreign Correspondents Day in 2001, pointed out that many events in the world occur that get little or no coverage from Western journalists. In addition, stories may be written about events and issues in those countries where there are resident foreign correspondents, but editors in Canada and the United States may choose not to publish them—so we, the public, do not become aware of what is occurring. Even when journalists try to research and represent the perspectives of all stakeholders, they can find their access and/or their ability to understand limited, for a variety of reasons. In our roles as readers and viewers, our access and ability to understand can also have many limitations—we may not have enough background knowledge to understand what we are reading, or why people say or believe or do what is portrayed. Our lack of background knowledge can cause us to fail to understand why it is important to others, or to ourselves, or why we are connected to the event. Our ignorance of global connections means that we may not understand that our actions can affect the situation or that we might be affected by it.

The rationale and philosophy for Alberta's K–12 program of studies for social studies articulates this guiding vision: "Social Studies provides opportunities for students to develop the attitudes, skills and knowledge that will enable them to become engaged, active, informed and responsible citizens" (p 1). Social studies teachers have an immense responsibility to teach students that, as active citizens, they will always face a need to research a situation from multiple perspectives that necessarily go beyond their own immediate presumptions and opinions. No single perspective, no single piece of mass media coverage, can be expected to give adequate insight into a major social issue or a contemporary or historical event. We must instill this expectation. We must also teach students proficient research skills. Developing the key understanding of "historic and contemporary issues, including controversial issues, from multiple perspectives" (Alberta Education 2005, 2, 6, 7, 8) is a learning outcome for all grades of social studies in Alberta.

Three Grade 6 teachers and I undertook the challenge of showing 90 Grade 6 students in an urban Alberta elementary school that it is always worthwhile to carry out research before you make a judgment, and that you cannot expect your day-to-day surroundings to provide all the information you need to make informed and fair judgments about how to act as an active, responsible citizen. The information, knowledge, values and practices that surround you are each permeated with a perspective—and you need multiple perspectives on a situation, event or problem to become really informed and act responsibly. We wanted to take the students through a series of active experiences that would help them live this, not merely to state its importance. We asked, "Can the Internet help our students build a greater understanding of others' perspectives? And of their own perspectives, as unique and affected by their own culture, rather than being universal? If so, how?" We wanted the students to undertake extended research, and we were curious about the potential of the Internet for providing motivating research experiences that would expose the students to multiple perspectives. We wanted to give the students a chance to change their minds and to come to understand that there can be reasonableness, and even truth, in a position that at first strikes them as completely bizarre or wrong. We designed a WebQuest to fit our requirements—to keep the students motivated to research over many weeks and to give us some control over the sites they viewed.

Teachers can design online WebQuests to help students gather detailed information from multiple sources to formulate a reasoned, evidence-based position on a controversial issue and, finally, to take action on the issue (Gibson 2001,1; http://webquest.org; Schrock 2005). WebQuests are often designed as simulations of a real-world problem or controversial issue. They engage students in active, inquiry-centred gathering and evaluation of information, values and arguments from multiple sources and perspectives. The students formulate an argument to support their own evidence-based position on a controversial issue. Finally, they communicate their position to others,

and very often complete their study by stepping out of the simulation and taking action in the world.

We decided to undertake an extended investigation into researching multiple perspectives on China. Although the study of the People's Republic of China has not been carried forward into Alberta's newest program of studies, we believe that the type of inquiry we pursued and our choice to use a WebQuest to pursue it are of value in the study of any intercultural or controversial issue from multiple perspectives—and there are certainly many such issues to explore in contemporary social studies.

A controversial issue is the one-child policy of the government of the People's Republic of China. We decided to undertake a multidimensional investigation of this issue over an extended period of time. In September, as part of language arts, the students studied the science fiction novella *Among the Hidden*, by Margaret Haddix. This story is written from the perspective of the third child in a family living in a society where it is illegal to have more than two children. For his entire life, the hero of this story has been hidden from everyone outside his family. Events and dialogue in the story help us empathize with his loneliness and fear. *Among the Hidden* portrays an unhappy, isolated child who is suffering to an extreme degree from his society's two-child policy. At this point our students, by and large, were totally against any policy that would attempt to legally limit the size of anyone's family. Meanwhile, in science, the teachers framed the study of the unit "Trees and Forests" within the important overarching idea of "Our Fragile Earth" and the harm our technologies and lifestyles are doing to our air, water, soil, climate and biodiversity. As they investigated the ecology of forests, the children culled news stories about environmental issues from newspapers and television to discuss in class.

By October, it was time to introduce the social studies unit "China: a Pacific Rim Nation." In 1979, the People's Republic of China instituted a law that prohibited a family from having more than one child. The policy is still in place. We wanted the students to research this law, and pursue the arguments and evidence that would lead reasonable people to adopt it. Our WebQuest was ready for them to work their way through.

Table 1. Description of China's One-Child Policy and Our Fragile Earth WebQuest

Component	Description
Introduction	How can we learn about another culture? What do you think Canadians need to learn about China so that we can understand how our two countries are independent and different, but also connected—that is, interdependent and similar? What knowledge might help people in China and Canada to interact with one another with mutual respect and interest? Why would we want positive interactions between our two countries? How can we understand China's one-child policy? To be fair, it needs to be understood from a variety of perspectives. Although people sometimes disagree with it, many people are sacrificing to adopt it because of the serious problems that overpopulation and overconsumption create on Earth. In this project, you will be able to use the websites listed below to research the one-child policy and explain why some people agree with it and others disagree.
The Task	You are a team of researchers that has been hired to prepare briefings for Canada's next ambassador to China. Your first task is to research China's one-child policy. The future ambassador needs you to create a PowerPoint presentation that will answer these questions: 1. 1. What is the policy? 2. When did the Chinese government adopt it? 3. Why was it adopted at the time? 4. What effects has it had? 5. Is overpopulation a problem in China? On Earth? Why? 6. Would overpopulation be a problem in China if people in the rich developed countries consumed less? How are overconsumption and overpopulation both problems? 7. What are the advantages and disadvantages of this policy? Is it doing some good? How? Who benefits? Who does not? 8. What can you, along with others, do to help our fragile Earth?

	When you have completed your research, design a PowerPoint presentation in order to brief Canada's next ambassador to China. In your presentation, you can include both text and images to show what you have learned about various perspectives on China's one-child policy. After you have understood the one-child policy from multiple perspectives, you will have an opportunity to discuss these issues with others in a roundtable discussion.
The Step-by-Step Process	1. Choose a partner to work with on this project. 2. Decide with your partner how you will record your notes on each research question. An effective way may be to • write each question down on a separate page; and • for each website, write its URL, the date you visited the page, and a summary of the information you found there. If a page contains a particularly effective image, you may want to describe it and write down its URL so that you can return to it later. 3. Research and take notes on the first four questions: • What is the one-child policy? • When did the Chinese government adopt it? • Why was it adopted at the time? • What effects has it had? 4. Review the information you have found so far and write your answer to each question in your journal. 5. Discuss your answers within your table groups. 6. Research Question 5: Participate in the population growth simulation in the gym. What factors increase population? Decrease it? Is overpopulation a problem in China? On Earth? Why or why not? 7. When you have finished your research, have a discussion with your whole class about overpopulation and analyze how it affects human beings and all other life on Earth. 8. Research Question 6: Would overpopulation still be a problem in China if people in the rich, developed countries consumed less? Do you think the problem is overpopulation, overconsumption, or a combination of both? 9. When you have finished your research, have a discussion with your whole class about the roles that overconsumption and overpopulation play on our fragile Earth. 10. Research Question 7: What else can you, I and others do to help our fragile Earth? 11. In your table groups, discuss the following questions: • What are the advantages and disadvantages of the one-child policy? • Is it doing some good? How? • Who benefits? • Who does not? • If you are not going to adopt a one-child policy, what else can you do to help our fragile Earth? 12. We will teach you how to use PowerPoint. 13. In your journal, plan how your group will work together to create a PowerPoint presentation briefing Canada's new ambassador to China on the one-child policy. a) Design one slide, or at most two, to answer each question. Include at least one image, but please do not use more than three, or your presentation will be too slow to load. When you are deciding whether or not to select an image for your presentation, remember to ask questions like these: i. Does the image show something important? ii. Does it help support, explain or extend what you are writing about in the slide? iii. Can the image be viewed clearly by your audience, or is it too small to see unless you are sitting very close to the computer? b) Decide who will create each page. c) Create a timeline to guide the creation of your presentation. d) Show your plan to your teacher.

	14. When you teacher has approved your plan, begin to create your presentation on the computer. 15. At the end of the project, you will be placed into a roundtable discussion group with students from all classes. You will be videotaped while you discuss what you have learned from this WebQuest.
Conclusion/ Extension	Write a letter to a person of your choice in which you explain whether or not you believe that having small families, or perhaps having only one child, is a worthwhile practice. Is it necessary if we are to help our fragile Earth? If we do not do this, what else can we do?

What the Students Learned

To assess the students' learning, we asked them to discuss their opinions in a videotaped roundtable format in groups of four to six. We found that all of the students had come to understand some of the reasons for China's adoption of a one-child policy and why it is important to do research before judging a perspective from another culture or a person. To illustrate, one student said this:

> Well, when I actually learned about the one-child policy, before this entire study, I had a very childish understanding—basically, if you moved to China, you had to kill all your children until you only had one, but now I realize that it wasn't *that* strict, and they allowed foreign families to have more than one child and farmers too.

The students differed on whether or not they thought limiting family size to one child is good or not, but they all understood why some people might decide that it was.

> *Student 1*: Before we studied the one-child policy, I thought it was a horrible law. But after we did our research on the one-child policy, and looked at population density, I understood why the Chinese government made that law. Doing the research gave me another perspective to look at the policy. Doing the research let me look at the policy from the government's perspective, elder's perspective, child's perspective, a scientist's perspective and an outsider's, which is our perspective. The research on the one-child policy really gave me a clearer picture. To the government, this would be a good way to control the population. To an elder, this wouldn't be a very good law because they would only have one son/daughter and only one grandchild. Then it would be a very lonely family. The child would have a lot of pressure and not be able to spend its time with its own friends. The child would have some social problems, too, because it wouldn't have anyone to socialize with other than its parents. Scientists would probably think that it was a good policy. The less [sic] people you have, there will be less pollution you have because you have less [sic] people to pollute the atmosphere, which can help stop global warming. If there weren't any global warming, then the polar bears wouldn't be disappearing. Without the one-child policy, China would be more overpopulated and have a larger population density.
>
> *Student 2*: After I researched the one-child policy and brainstormed about all the effects that would happen without the one-child policy and what is happening with the one-child policy in China, it has made me think that the policy does have a good side. So I think the one-child policy isn't that bad after all.

We found that the WebQuest did give students the opportunity to be active in their learning and kept their motivation high as they systematically researched over several weeks. They seemed to enjoy knowing where they were headed and entered eagerly into discussions throughout the unit.

We recommend the use of teacher-designed WebQuests. It is no harder to design one with Netscape Composer or Microsoft Word, or any other authoring program, than it is to use a word processor. In social studies, there are many questions and topics that lend themselves to using WebQuests to help students research and understand multiple perspectives, keep motivation high while they do extensive research, and practise developing "the attitudes, skills and knowledge that will enable them to become engaged, active, informed and responsible citizens" (Alberta Education 2005, 1).

Whenever I remember gazing at that shrouded and overgrown little house, I feel sorry that we all reacted with fear to a little old lady who night actually have enjoyed being around children. I wish we had learned that we should investigate, rather than believe the first thing we were told about a person. Hopefully, as social studies teachers, we can instill the ethic in our

students that they need to research events, rather than react to rumours and fear-mongering, even from the media. Hopefully this will create openness to learning about others' realities, help dissolve unnecessary barriers between people from different nations—and even reduce the number of elderly people living in loneliness in our communities.

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Book Review

Reviewed by John W Friesen

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The Courts and the Colonies: The Litigation of Hutterite Church Disputes

Alvin J Esau

University of British Columbia Press, 2005
384 pages (including appendix, notes and index)
$34.95 (paperback)

This book documents an unfortunate chapter in the history of the world's most successful commune, which to date has lasted nearly half a millennium. The Hutterite movement originated in 1530, as part of the Anabaptist wing of the Reformation. To escape religious persecution, its followers gradually made their way across various European countries, including Russia, eventually arriving in North America. After settling in the Dakotas, the Hutterites soon became recognizable as three distinct communities—*Dariusleut* (named after their leader), *Lehrerleut* (teacher people) and *Schmiedeleut* (blacksmith people). Esau documents the fragmentation of the last group a century after their arrival in Manitoba. As has become evident to observers, the Schmiedeleut have always been a bit more progressive in their thinking than the other two groups, and this perhaps explains their willingness to negotiate a merger with an outside group. The group in question is the *Bruderhof*, also known as the Society of Brothers.

Esau identifies the Bruderhof as a key player in the Hutterite schism. It was a group not entirely unlike the Hutterites, but it had originated in 1920, in Germany, under the leadership of theologian Eberhard Arnold. Gradually the Bruderhof began colonies in Germany, England, Uruguay and the United States (today they operate colonies in New York, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, England and Australia). Initial merger talks between the two groups occurred as early as the 1930s, thus igniting an on-again, off-again relationship that lasted some seventy years.

By the 1950s, again interested in a merger with the Hutterites, Bruderhof leaders began to advocate the adoption of Hutterite dress. They also made strong overtures to Hutterite leaders to merge with them. The leading elder of the Manitoba Schmiedeleut, Jacob Kleinsasser, was sympathetic to a union between the two groups, and merger structures were soon developed. Many Schmiedeleut ministers did not agree with this decision, and it did not take long for questions to arise about the wisdom of the undertaking. Unlike Hutterites, the Bruderhof affirmed the arts—music, painting, dancing and poetry—and celebrated their "love feasts" with songs and skits. These practices alarmed Hutterite ministers, who also worried about the Bruderhof's evangelical zeal and solicitation of new members from "prisons, blood banks, soup kitchens, and shelters for the homeless" (p 24).

Kleinsasser's response to opposition was simply to excommunicate dissident ministers, but this action was really only the beginning of a long struggle. Within the next decade, a series of painful litigations were launched within the Hutterite community that would forever change the way they viewed the law. Before this, disagreements were always settled by internal structures and procedures. Esau's documenting of the deviation from this practice makes this book, a case study of religiously based inside law turning to outside law to resolve disputes, unique.

The Courts and the Colonies has twelve chapters, and begins with an overview of the Hutterite and Bruderhof movements (chapters 1 and 2) and the place of litigation within that theological framework (chapters 3 and 4). The chapters that follow outline specific legal cases within the Hutterite community, leading ultimately to the schism that permanently divided the Schmiedeleut people (chapters 5 to 11). Esau ends the book by discussing the implications of intertwining sacred and secular law.

Esau is a professor in the Faculty of Law at the University of Manitoba, but he does not write like a lawyer or an academic. Instead, despite the sometimes sordid and unfortunate developments he documents, he tells a good story. Esau manages to keep his readers spellbound throughout what seems to be an endless list of litigations involving brother against brother. Traditionally, Hutterites do not believe in taking one another to court, but in the last decade there have been a rash of lawsuits in which they have done just that. Following Hutterite theology and practice, Esau raises the question, "How can the [Hutterite] church now claim to have a prohibition on aggressive lawsuits against outsiders when the church leaders are willing to go to law against one another?" (p 59).

Esau writes as a member of the Mennonite community (historic cousins to the Hutterites), and occasionally uses phrases that bespeak this connection (for example, on p xi). On page 37 he intimates that, viewed from an Anabaptist perspective, litigation is a problematic procedure and can be manipulative, hurtful or even wrong. He also offers a personally interpretive opinion when he suggests that if Jacob Kleinsasser had stepped down as senior elder in 1992, the Schmiedeleut probably would not have split and the connection with the Bruderhof would have been over once and for all (p 207). These kinds of statements are indicative of Esau's sympathy for Hutterite sufferings as a result of litigation and thus make his story much more humane.

Esau is not the only one to sympathize with the Hutterites. He notes that at the conclusion of one particular trial, Justice Ferg observed that the Hutterites were a credit to the ways of their faith, and he sympathized with the agony they suffered as a result of the litigations. As he put it, "Just remember that you gain spiritually through suffering. Some good can come out of this and I hope you will find peace in your hearts" (p 141).

The Hutterites' longstanding record of peaceful living is second to none, even though a multiplicity of cases has been launched against them during their sojourn in North America. The record shows that by the year 2000, at least fifty court case claims have been made against colonies in Manitoba alone. Of course, most of the cases involved the same handful of colonies. The Hutterite experience in the United States is not much different, as Esau points out. However, it is one thing to be the target of outside litigation, but for brother to rise up against brother had theretofore been unthinkable.

The Courts and the Colonies is a very readable account of an unfortunate tragedy in utopia. Esau has done all of us a good service by documenting the various chapters of this sad saga in a careful yet sensitive manner. This book undoubtedly deserves a much wider reading audience than it will receive. Through a unique case study, it tellingly reveals the commonality of the humanness of us all.

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

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